In political sociology, cross-carpeting is rarely ideological. In our context, it represents structural desperation: the impulse to abandon institution-building for shortcut politics when the cost of coalition-building appears high. The alleged move of Peter Obi and Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso toward the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) reads exactly like that. It will not strengthen the opposition; it will fracture it, weaken its bargaining power, and hand the ruling APC a second term by default.
Turning to history, the 2023 elections exposed the sociology of counter-hegemony. Bola Tinubu won with 8,794,726 votes, 36.6% of valid votes cast. Peter Obi polled 6,101,533, while Rabiu Kwankwaso scored 1,496,687. Atiku Abubakar had 6,984,520.
Individually, none of the opposition heavyweights crossed the 30% threshold. Combined, Obi and Kwankwaso delivered 7,598,220 votes, only 1.2 million behind Tinubu, despite having no joint agents in most states. Adding Atiku, the opposition bloc exceeded 14.5 million votes, enough to unseat the ruling party. The APC understands this data better than anyone. Hence, its primary strategy since May 29, 2023, has been to engineer elite exits from any emerging bloc. Every new platform floated becomes a solvent poured on opposition aggregation. If Obi and Kwankwaso defect, they will effectively be executing the ruling party’s strategy. In the end, APC wins without expanding its base.
From the perspective of opposition politics, it is now clear even to the politically indifferent that the ADC has been battered. On April 28, 2026, the Federal High Court voided congresses conducted by the David Mark-led caretaker committee, raising fears over INEC recognition. Attorney-General Lateef Fagbemi’s suit to deregister ADC under Section 225A further deepened the uncertainty.
Yet political sociology helps us distinguish institutional crisis from institutional death. A protective line drawn to ensure ADC’s survival as the only viable opposition has been strengthened by the Supreme Court’s affirmation of ADC’s leadership in its April 30 judgment. The ruling achieved three things: it neutralised the INEC recognition argument, blunted the AGF’s deregistration move, and recast ADC as a court-certified institution combining three of the most difficult assets in opposition politics—legal certainty, ballot eligibility, and bureaucratic continuity.
The NDC, registered in 2024, has none of these. No legislative seat, no 132,000-plus agent database, no record of surviving pre-election litigation. To abandon ADC for NDC is to trade a validated institution for an untested one. That is not strategy; it is desperation for power, and desperation reproduces defeat.
A Word to Obi: Service Before Position
Peter Obi should test his strength within the ADC. The Supreme Court has cleared the legal path. If he wins the ticket, he leads a court-affirmed platform with national structure. If he does not, he faces a sociological test: is the goal to serve Nigeria or to occupy Aso Rock at all costs?
If service is the motive, then he must be ready to accept a running mate position. The time has come to prove that the Obidient movement is a moral crusade, not an ethnic one. Its credibility rests on Obi’s readiness to make sacrifices. Refusing to deputise would confirm the APC’s framing of his movement as an individualist project. Accepting it would transform the ADC into a pan-Nigerian coalition and preserve the 6.1 million votes as opposition capital, not wasted sentiment.
A Word to Kwankwaso: Coalition Over Ego
Rabiu Kwankwaso’s NNPP is largely a one-state political machine. It delivered 59% of the vote in Kano, the only state where the 25% threshold was met in 2023. Section 134 requires 25% in at least 24 states. His national pathway therefore runs through a Southern alliance.
Going forward, however, a Kwankwaso–Obi ticket under the NDC is a failed mission. It lacks INEC-validated structure, cannot meet the May 30 membership deadline, and could be voided by the courts before January 2027.
Kwankwaso should work with existing opposition leadership to secure electoral victory. The ADC, following the Supreme Court judgment, remains the only neutral platform where Northern populism and Southern reformism can negotiate without allegations of capture. His Kano structure, combined with ADC’s 132,000-plus agents, is the only empirical route to meeting the 25% requirement in 24 states. Standing alone will end in regional isolation. That outcome would gift the APC another four years and reinforce the allegation that Kwankwaso works for the ruling party.
Conclusion
Cross-carpeting at this stage signals elite panic, not strategic calculation. It weakens opposition cohesion and gives the APC an unearned advantage. The 2027 election will be decided by Form EC8A, not by press statements announcing new parties.
The ADC was leaking; the Supreme Court has cauterised the legal wound. It is now an institution with a flag, a register, and a judgment that INEC must obey. Obi should contest within it and, if necessary, subordinate ambition to service. Kwankwaso should consolidate rather than defect, because a partnership outside a stable platform can fly nowhere.
The mirage will still shimmer the morning after the election. By then, thirst will be irrelevant. Only institutions drink.
Dr Kawu Adamu Sule is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Bayero University Kano, Nigeria. He is a political commentator with interests in party politics and campaign strategies.
Email: skadamu.soc@buk.edu.ng
